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Introduction
In 1971, a diverse band of political activists, linked by their common experience as targets of
police espionage and harassment, took an ambitious stand against such covert operations by filing a
class action lawsuit styled Handschu v. Special Services Division against the NYPD and the Mayor of
New York City.1 The Handschu plaintiffs had previously attempted to challenge racism, sexism,
homophobia, war, corruption, and capitalism through activism. However, since the late 1960s, they, and
the grassroots political organizations they created, had been targeted by a massive wave of covert
political policing (CPP) operations run by the NYPD's Intelligence arm (INTEL).2 They argued that
INTEL had pushed their political projects past the point of collapse by using tactics including
surveillance, political interrogation, and entrapment to sewed paranoia and fear within their members.
Having abandoned their previous activist methods, the plaintiffs chose to fight back through the legal
system, apparently the only institutional avenue left open to them. They initially hoped that a court case
would allow them to uncover the scope and specifics of INTEL's massive operation. They also hoped
to secure a court ruling that INTEL had violated their constitutional rights, thus forcing the court to
regulate CPP by directly interfering with the NYPD's internal operations. The Handschu plaintiffs
faced staunch opposition from the defendants and an increasingly conservative Supreme Court and, by
1979, they had dropped their original goals to secure a settlement with the defendants, creating a
1Keeping track of the various iterations of Handschu v. Special Services Division. can result in serious headaches. The case
itself was first brought in 1971. Federal District Court Judge Charles Haight granted their request for class certification in
1979 after eight years of discovery. In 1981, plaintiff counsel reached a settlement with the defendants. Judge Haight
approved the Handschu settlement in 1985. That settlement created the Handschu guidelines, which the NYPD promised
to obey. It also created the Handschu authority, the body of two NYPD personnel and one civilian lawyer which would be
granted oversight and veto power over CPP to ensure that they followed the Handschu guidelines. In 2003, NYPD
spokesman David Cohen convinced Judge Haight to alter the settlement's terms, producing the modified Handschu
guidelines and robing the Handschu authority of its powers of review and veto among other changes. Haight incorporated
the new NYPD patrol guidelines, which had been altered to include the FBI rules, within the decision later that same year,
making their violation an act of contempt, though Haight would never enforce this. The Handschu guidelines were further
altered in 2017, producing the current revised Handschu guidelines and replacing the modified Handschu authority with
the Handschu committee, a body of 11 NYPD employees and a single civilian with more powers than under the modified
Handschu guidelines but less than under the 1985 settlement.
2When the term “covert political policing” (CPP) appears in this thesis, it refers to police operations utilizing use covert
tactics against individuals or groups targeted for exercising their Constitutionally protected rights. My list of covert tactics is
adapted from the original 1971 Handschu complaint and includes “overt and covert physical surveillance, covert electronic
surveillance, infiltration, undercover intelligence gathering, maintenance of files and dossiers and provocation” by police
agents. Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

managerial authority which they hoped would regulate CPP. Yet, the Handschu settlement (reached in
1981, approved in 1985, and heavily altered in 2003 and again in 2017) has proven a flimsy barrier to
abusive CPP operations and, at times, actively assisted them. Half a century later, Handschu v. Special
Services Division has achieved none of its plaintiffs' original or subsequent goals.
Handschu's declining fortunes display some of the perils of pursuing activism through the
American legal system of the 20th and 21st centuries. The confident language and goals of their initial
1971 suit demonstrate the plaintiffs' faith that they could use the court system to reshape state and local
agencies, thanks to precedent set by the progressive Warren Court. The comparatively meager
settlement approved by the federal district court in 1985 demonstrates the extent to which the Burger
Court had dismantled that power after the mid-1970s. The case also illustrates how this withdrawal by
the court system strengthened the NYPD, a local agency whose reach has grown as court interference
with its operations has diminished, trapping Handschu in cycles of failure and retreat. Crippled by
police-friendly language and unable to compel compliance with its guidelines, the Handschu settlement
has been eclipsed by more recent political efforts at police reform achieved through electoral tactics
supported by local mobilization.

Historiography
Since the early 1990s, the topic of civil liberties violations by municipal police forces has
received increasing academic attention. Yet, specific coverage of CPP remains sparse, such that Frank
Donner's Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (1992) remains
the most direct treatment of the subject. Donner, a civil liberties attorney, placed CPP's beginnings in
the Progressive era, when municipal police forces first formed “red squads” to monitor and quell leftist
organization. Donner also observed that cities expanded these initiatives in the mid-1930s, after
Supreme Court rulings prevented them from using overt violence to effect political control and that, in

the 1960s, these local squads became the nation's primary enforcers of the political order, exceeding
federal agencies in size and reach.3 Historian Marilynn S. Johnson includes brief but succinct coverage
of CPP in Street Justice; A History of Police Violence in New York City (2003), the best current
treatment of the related issue of police brutality within the NYPD since its founding.4 Since the original
BLM movement of 2014, works focusing on police suppression of radicalized groups have discussed
CPP. In From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime; The Making of Mass Incarceration in America
(2016), Hinton argues that police departments paired covert and overt tactics as they shifted their focus
from political activists to criminalized urban Blacks in the late 1960s. Historian Elizabeth Hinton
concurs that municipal agencies embraced CPP as a less visible, and thus less politically unpopular,
alternative to direct violence and argues that CPP continued to expand because it synergized well with
the simultaneous rise of “intelligence-led policing” in the 20th century. Hinton also notes that many CPP
tactics used and promoted by the U.S. Government in the post-LBJ era were first innovated by local
municipal crime squads during and after President Lyndon Johnson's administration, particularly in
New York and Washington D. C.5 The topic of municipal CPP is ripe for further study. An up-to-date
synthetic history of CPP by America's police departments, including coverage of the CPP of American
Muslims in the War on Terror era, is sorely needed.
This thesis is heavily inspired by legal historians' growing skepticism of previous scholarship
crediting social change primarily to legal activism. Such skepticism has deep roots. Legal scholars such
as Derrick Bell6 and Donald L. Horowitz,7 have questioned the effectiveness of activist litigation for
many decades. In The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change (1991), legal scholar
3Micheal R. Belknap, “Book Review: Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America by
Frank Donner,” Constitutional Commentary 9, no. 2 (1992).
4Marilynn S. Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003).
5Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime; The Making of Mass Incarceration in America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).
6Derrick Bell, “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,” Harvard Law Review 93, No. 3
(January 1980): 518-533. Derrick Bell, “Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation,” Yale Law Journal 85, no. 4 (March 1976). Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of
Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
7Donald L. Horowitz, “Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervisions of Public Institutions,” Duke Law Journal
1983, no. 6 (December 1983): 1265-1307.

Gerald Rosenberg build from this skeptical tradition by arguing that the two most famous activist court
decisions of the 20th century, Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, played almost no role in,
respectively, desegregating public education and securing access to abortions.8 Though initially
controversial, his proposal, that the courts are an unsuitable venue for activism, has gained momentum
within historical scholarship. Historians James T. Patterson and Micheal J. Klarman both criticize and
expand on Rosenberg's proposal in Brown v. Board of Education; A Civil Rights Milestone and Its
Troubled Legacy (2001)9 and From Jim Crow to Civil Rights; The Supreme Court and the Struggle for
Racial Equality (2004),10 respectively. Historian Anders Walker takes a stronger stance in The Ghost of
Jim Crow: How Southern Moderates Used Brown v. Board of Education to Stall Civil Rights (2010),
arguing that local Southern moderate politicians used technical compliance with Brown's ruling to
modernize and centralize their state governments and rehabilitate their tarnished images while
replacing de jurre segregation with northern-style de facto segregation. Thus, Walker argues that
compliance with Brown sometimes directly served segregationist aims.11 Skepticism of the of the legal
system's legacy and future efficacy as an avenue for activism will likely continue to expand within and
without the academy as the Warren Court and its accomplishments fade further into the past.
I. A Serious Police Problem: Handschu's Plaintiffs Sued to End New York's Golden Age of CPP
The sixteen individuals who would become Handschu's plaintiffs were brought together by a
common personal experience. In the late 1960s, they had all been fighting for political change. Some
acted as individuals within the student movement at New York University. Most were members of
grassroots political organizations such as the Vietnam Peace Parade Committee, the Gay Liberation
Front, and the Black Panther Party. One had fought for police reform as a member of the Abolish BOSS
8Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change, second edition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008).
9James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education; A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled Legacy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
10Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights; The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
11Anders Walker, The Ghost of Jim Crow: How Southern Moderates Used Brown v. Board of Education to Stall Civil
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Committee, a group formed to oppose political espionage operations by the Bureau of Special Services,
a powerful agency within the NYPD's intelligence arm. However, by 1971, these activists, and the
groups with which they were affiliated, had been targeted and destroyed by an enormous domestic
espionage program run by BOSS. At its height, BOSS's files contained the names and details of over a
million New Yorkers, targeted because NYPD operatives found their political activities suspicious.12
The future plaintiffs had been harassed, surveilled, and informed on by police agents and most of their
activist groups had collapsed under this pressure. However, the in-court revelations of the prominent
“Panther 21” trial of 1969-1971 revealed some of BOSS's scope and inspired these isolated activists to
unite and take legal action against BOSS.
To understand why the Handschu case occurred in 1971, we must examine the origins of the
specific wave of CPP against which the Handschu plaintiffs sued. During the Handschu case, Police
Commissioner Patrick Murphy, appointed in 1970, would argue that the NYPD had historically
embraced CPP out of necessity during politically turbulent times when dangerous actors had threatened
public safety. Thus, in the 1960s, the department had embraced CPP because some activists had
abandoned peaceful protest and moved underground to practice “urban guerrilla warfare.”13 Though
Murphy claimed that these tactics had been developed to counter violent underground radicals, he
clarified that CPP “was not limited to investigations of crime, but related to any activity likely to result
in “a serious police problem” as decided by the police themselves.14 In practice, BOSS used covert
tactics against peaceful groups because they were in contact with other groups the NYPD was
investigating. Murphy would openly admit that BOSS had targeted these “malcontents” with tactics
including the use of “infiltrators and informers.... telephone wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping,
surreptitious recording of conversations, covert photography… recording speeches at demonstrations....
[and issuing] false working press credentials to its officers.” Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman argue
12Handschu v. Special Services Division, LEXIS 12148 1979 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
13Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD's Secret Spying Unit and Bin Laden's Final Plot
Against America (Touchstone: New York, 2013), 44.
14Handschu v. Special Services Division, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

that this policy produced a pattern of operations targeting individuals and groups simply because of
their association to previous targets, a phenomenon known as “mission creep” in which a covert
mission would creep outward to encompass more and more people. Because the police operated in
secret, these groups could not fight back.15
Murphy's account is somewhat supported by historian Marilynn S. Johnson, who specifically
points out that many activists had moved underground and adopted more violent tactics because
President Richard Nixon's gradual deescalation of American involvement in the Vietnam conflict
isolated them from the mainstream of American political activity.16 Yet, Johnson challenges the idea
that the police had simply implemented controversial but justified measures in reaction to underground
political violence and notes that many activists had moved underground to escape police violence after
events such as the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.17 Johnson also complicates
Murphy's narrative by observing that the NYPD has historically expanded CPP campaigns when public
opposition to more visible methods of political control such as mass arrests and overt violence has
made such tactics politically unfeasible. The NYPD first deployed CPP in 1914 under Arthur Woods,
Police Commissioner to Mayor John Purroy Mitchel, who been elected on an anti-police brutality
ticket.18 In the late 1930s, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and Police Commissioner Lewis Valentine
similarly embraced CPP because of opposition to police brutality at the local and federal level.19 In the
late 1960s, Johnson argues that Mayor Lindsay had faced a similar public backlash inspired by highly

15Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within, 44-45.
16Johnson, Street Justice, 274.
17 Johnson, Street Justice, 265-266.
18Woods formed the Bomb Squad in 1914 and the Industrial Squad in 1917 to infiltrate and destabilize various anarchist,
communist, and socialist groups, as well as labor organizations and mainstream political organizations. Johnson, Street
Justice, 110-111, 158-160.
19Johnson notes that several 1937 Supreme Court decisions blocked police forces from using overt violence against labor
groups. The court notably defended the rights of workers to unionize, bargain collectively, and strike. They also affirmed the
first amendment rights of political dissidents in Dejong v. Oregon and Herndon v. Georgia. The same year, newsreel footage
of the horrific “memorial day massacre” of 1937, in which Chicago PD officers had opened fire on picketing strikers, killing
10 and wounding 30, before beating the survivors, played in movie theaters nationwide, spurring public resistance to police
brutality. Johnson, Street Justice, 178.

visible police violence in New York and other major US cities.20 Thus, Lindsay and his Police
Commissioners had adopted CPP tactics, which they hoped to be, in Johnson's words, “more effective,
less controversial, and less likely to generate public sympathy for radical causes,” slowly generating the
CPP campaign that targeted the Handschu plaintiffs.21
While BOSS's CPP campaign had inspired the resentment of the future Handschu plaintiffs, it
was one poorly planned operation which united them and motivated them to sue. On April 2, 1969, the
NYPD indited 21 members of New York's chapter of the Black Panther Party, accusing them of
planning to bomb numerous New York City buildings including police stations, department stores, and
the Bronx Botanical Garden. However, over the course of the Panthers' trial, police prosecutors began
to reveal to the court that the NYPD's entire operation against the Panthers had been masterminded,
supplied, and run, by police agents, specifically, Gene Roberts,22 Ralph White, and Carlos Ashwood,
the three Panthers most responsible for planning these attacks. As BOSS agents, Roberts, White, and
Ashwood had first been tasked with providing their NYPD superiors with daily lists of the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of every BPP meeting attendee. They had also supplied the weaponry
and explosives to be used in the plot, and the indictment, including twelve counts of conspiracy to
commit arson and murder, was based on their testimonies.23 These revelations made the public aware
for the first time of the NYPD's CPP campaign and, despite the opposition of the presiding Judge, the
jury responded by unanimously acquitting the arrested Panthers.
Meanwhile, the Panther 21 Trial attracted the attention of Handschu's future plaintiffs. Martin
Stolar, Defense Attorney and member of the New York Law Commune, had been collecting
20Johnson, Street Justice, 256-258. Police officers notably attacked middle and upper-class white college students during
their 1968 occupation of buildings on the Columbia University campus. The same year, a crowd of 150, including many offduty police officers, attacked a small group of Black Panthers and white allies inside a Brooklyn courthouse. Johnson argues
that these events particularly damaged the NYPD's reputation among a politically significant number of New Yorkers.
Johnson, Street Justice, 265, 267-268.
21 Johnson, Street Justice, 275.
22Gene Roberts had infiltrated several organizations since 1964, including the Organization of Afro-American Unity,
where he served as one of Malcolm X’s Bodyguards. He witnessed Malcolm X’s 1965 murder but, under orders from his
superiors, he did not testify in trial to preserve his cover. Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
23 Handschu, 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

circumstantial evidence of CPP operations against his activist clients for years and, the in-court
revelations he witnessed while serving on the Panther's legal team more than confirmed his
suspicions.24 During the trial, Stolar contacted fellow veteran activist attorney Jethro Eisenstein.
Together they reached out into NYC’s activist circles to find people with similar experiences who
wanted to fight back and sixteen plaintiffs stepped forward, including Barbra Handschu, an activist
lawyer whose long career, including helping to represent the inmates charged after the Attica Prison
Riots, would help earn her an F.B.I. file two inches thick.25 These activists filed a federal lawsuit on
May 18, 1971, only five days after the Panthers were acquitted. Bureau of Special Services had
recently been re-designated the Special Services Division and Handschu was listed first among the
plaintiffs.26 Thus, the plaintiffs christened their suit Handschu v. Special Services Division.
The Handschu plaintiffs adopted the extremely ambitious goal of having their treatment
declared unconstitutional by a federal judge. This grand ambition was, however, grounded in the legal
environment of the time, when courts' greater willingness to interfere in local governmental affairs had
made ambitious court activism a very popular tactic among activists. In “Decreeing Organizational
Change: Judicial Supervisions of Public Institutions” (1983), legal scholar Donald L. Horowitz dates
the start of this era to 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to empower
judges to manage cases more actively and to enable them to reform local authorities.27 However, court
activism had become even more popular after the Supreme Court, as led by Chief Justice Earl Warren,
produced sweeping decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education (1955), which shook the seemingly
24Law communes were a brief trend in the late 1960s-early 1970s. Young activist lawyers and law workers (legal aids,
secretaries, students) formed them in metropolises like New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, but also in smaller cities like
Carbondale Illinois. Their primary goals were activism and defending radical groups including the Black Panthers and the
Young Lords. These communes lived, worked, and made all decisions communally for very little pay. The NY Commune
disbanded in July 1971. The times blamed internal conflict. Robert Reinhold, “Law Communes’ in Cities Seek Social
Change Through Politics,” New York Times, September 5, 1971.
25 Larry Neumeister, “For NY lawyer, a 45-year-old surveillance case is her legacy,” AP News, May 28, 2016.
26The original plaintiffs were Attorney Barbra Handschu, Ralph DiGia of the War Resisters League, New York Black
Panthers Alex McKeiver, Shaba Om and Curtis M, Powell, Youth International Party member Abbie Hoffman, Mark A.
Segal of the Gay Liberation Front, Michael Zumoff and Kenneth Thomas of Computer People for Peace, Robert Rusch and
Annette T. Rubinstein of the Charter Group for a Pledge of Conscience, Mickey Sheridan of the Vietnam Peace Parade
Committee, NYU Students Joe Sucher and Steven Pischler, and Howard Blatt, and Elli Benzoni of the Abolish BOSS
Committee. Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 3.
27Horowitz, “Decreeing Organizational Change,” 1271.

unassailable system of de jurre segregation and Baker v. Carr (1962), which allowed courts to interfere
with the internal operations of government bodies. To American activists, these decisions seemed to
have kicked open the door to a new realm of social and political action. As Horowitz writes, “What was
unthinkable before became litigable.” Activists embraced the court system as a venue for sociopolitical
change, producing an explosion of cases attempting to win reforms which they had been unable to
achieve via other political avenues.28 To the Handschu plaintiffs, who had met bitter resistance within
the forms of activism they had previously favored, litigation seemed a viable alternative. Thus, they
aimed high, explicitly stating that the “question of law and fact” within their case was whether the
defendants violated their rights under the Constitution. Hopefully, a positive ruling from a federal judge
would force him to produce an injunction to directly reign in the NYPD.29
The plaintiffs sued under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute allowing them to
pursue a civil rights lawsuit against a state actor who, under color of law, had deprived plaintiffs of
their constitutional rights. The Handschu plaintiffs owed a deep debt to the Warren Court in their use of
this statute. 42 U.S.C § 1983, established in 1871, had not been used to sue state officials until the
Warren Court supported a more liberal reading of the statute ruling in their decision of Monroe v. Pape
(1961).30 Thus, the very foundations of the Handschu case rested on favorable precedent established by
the Warren Court. The plaintiffs presented themselves to the court as representatives of an open ended
class which they defined as including all New Yorkers whose unpopular or controversial beliefs and
associations had seen them “subjected to or threatened by… infiltration, physical surveillance,
provocation of violence, recruitment to act as police informers and dossier collection by defendants and
their accents… in violation of their constitutional rights of privacy, free speech and association” by the
defendants.31 The list of defendants was also open-ended, including the NYPD itself and its police
commissioner, the NYPD's intelligence arm (then known as SSD) and its commander, Mayor John
28Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change, 1280-821.
29 Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 2-3.
30“Section 1983 and Civil Rights Lawsuits,” FindLaw, updated March 20, 2019.
31Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 15.

Lindsay of the City of New York, and also “various unknown defendants [including] police officers,
police agents, undercover agents, informers, etc., whose identities are presently unknown.”32
By deploying CPP tactics, plaintiffs claimed, defendants had intentionally and systematically
deprived them and their proposed class of numerous constitutional rights. Being subjected to CPP had
chilled and deterred the exercise of their rights to free speech, assembly, and association, and privacy
secured under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth constitutional amendments. Because these acts had
included unreasonable searches and seizures conducted without warrants, they had violated plaintiffs'
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.33 Because the police had exceeded the
scope of their “crime prevention and law enforcement authority” and had acted unilaterally without
judicial approval, they had violated plaintiffs' rights to substantive and procedural due process secured
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants had visited cruel and unusual punishments
upon plaintiffs and deprived them of their liberties and property without due process of law, violating
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, the police's specific use of informers, infiltration,
interrogation, and electronic surveillance had violated plaintiffs' rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.34
Wisely, the plaintiffs grounded these rather technical claims within their personal experience as
targets of specific tactics which had been particularly harmful: the use of informants, infiltration,
interrogation, overt surveillance, summary punishment, intelligence gathering, and electronic
surveillance. Notably, they also described how the indirect effects of these tactics had reached beyond
the individuals and groups who the police had targeted directly. CPP, the plaintiffs argued, had
poisoned the atmosphere of the broader activist community, sewing paranoia and fear which had
compelled activists to abandon their political efforts and self-police their behavior and speech to avoid
32Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 16-18.
33This accusation by plaintiffs also owes a debt to the Warren court, whose highly controversial decision of Terry v. Mapp
(1961) applied the Fourth Amendment to state level authorities as well as federal ones. Before this ruling, the Handschu
plaintiffs could not have argued that a municipal police department had violated their constitutional rights by committing
unreasonable searches and seizures without warrants. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34 Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 17-19.

being targeted themselves. For example, members of the defunct Veterans and Reservists Against the
War in Vietnam complained that BOSS had destroyed that group via both the direct and indirect effects
of CPP. BOSS informant Richard Lyons had secretly infiltrated V&R in 1967 to report who said what
at meetings while trying to persuade its members to break the law. When members discovered Lyons’
identity, the revelation “created such fear… and so chilled their interest in the rights of free expression
and association that they fled V&R en mass. The organization was disbanded shortly thereafter. In turn,
NYU students Joe Sucher, Steven Fischler, and Howard Blatt accused INTEL agents of repeatedly
visiting their homes to explicitly discourage them from continuing political film-making. After being
arrested at a protest, Robert Reilly and Jonah Raskin had been outed by SSD agents as “veteran
political activists” whereupon officers had severely beaten them in the 17th precinct station house in
October, 1969.35 These reports and others grounded the plaintiffs' accusations in reality and would be
instrumental in convincing Handschu's presiding judge to recognize the proposed Handschu class.36
If the accusations the Handschu plaintiffs had made were expansive, the forms of relief which
they demanded were equally so. Hoping to change the nature of NYPD intelligence operations, they
requested a list of declaratory judgments and court orders by the presiding judge including judgements
that the actions of the defendants, as well as the NYPD mandate which defined INTEL's role and
purpose, to be unconstitutional.37 The plaintiffs also demanded that the court order INTEL to turn their
entire file archive over for inspection by plaintiff counsel and that all files which either violated the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights or which bore no law enforcement purpose, be destroyed, a truly
immense act of court interference. Finally, the plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin the defendants
35Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 13-14.
36Handschu, 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
37The official duties of the SSD at the time, as defined in the NYPD's rules and regulations, were (a) to investigate labor
disputes; (b) to guard visiting dignitaries; (c) to cooperate with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service in
deportation investigations; (d) to maintain files on persons arrested or seizures made “in connection with the distribution of
anarchistic or other unlawful literature of such nature”; (f) e) to maintain files on persons arrested or seizures made “in
connection with the distribution of anarchistic or other unlawful literature of such nature” (f) to conduct other investigations
as directed by the chief of detection or other competent authority. The Handschu plaintiffs complained these broad,
undefined terms were open to interpretation by officers, creating opportunities for abuse. Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 4.

from creating similar files, from employing informants, infiltration, interrogation, and electronic
surveillance, unless authorized by an undefined “appropriate authority”, and from practicing “overt
surveillance” and “summary punishment” entirely.38 Clearly, the plaintiffs' goals reached far beyond
redress of their individual grievances. Rather, they wanted to prevent the defendants from using such
tactics to destroy future social movements.
The Handschu plaintiffs immediately faced fierce opposition from the defendants. Assuming
that the court would side with them, they refused to deny any of the plaintiff's accounts of abuse by the
former SSD, now renamed the Security and Investigation Section (SIS). Instead, Commissioner
Murphy denied, via an affidavit, that these incidents were linked, or that they indicated a greater system
of abuse. CPP tactics, Murphy argued, were a legal and constitutional part of the NYPD's toolkit
“within the scope of its duties… to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public.” The NYPD's
intelligence arm had used these tactics without outside oversight since the 1930s and Murphy argued
that this long history should not be interrupted because of what he called “the few unrelated and
isolated events.”39 Defense counsel requested that the case be summarily dismissed.
Despite this opposition, presiding judge Edward Weinfeld handed the Handschu plaintiffs their
first victory fifteen months after they initiated the suit by refusing Murphy's request to dismiss their
case. Judge Weinfeld, who had held his position as a judge of New York's Southern District since 1950
and would produce over 2,000 opinions before his death in 1988, had already presided over several
notable cases, challenging Senator Joseph McCarthy's right to interrogate Americans before his senate
subcommittee and enjoining a merger between Bethlehem Steel Corp and Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co.40 The single opinion he produced within the Handschu case was concise and fair. Within this 1972
decision, Weinfeld accepted Murphy's argument that covert tactics could play a vital role in many
necessary and justified criminal investigations. However, he noted that such covert tactics could not be
38Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 19-20.
39Handschu, 349 F. Supp. 766, (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
40John G. Koeltl, “The Storied Third Branch: Reflections on Judge Edward Weinfeld,” Judicature 100, no. 2 (Summer,
2016).

justified if they violated the Constitution and that, if the plaintiffs' accusations were accurate, this may
well have been the case.
To determine the correct decision, Weinfeld looked to the Rules of Civil Procedure. He noted
that Murphy’s affidavit had not factually denied any of the plaintiff’s assertions nor presented any
counter-evidence. Further, defense counsel could not prove that the plaintiffs were “entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of their claims.” On the contrary, Weinfeld
had been convinced that relief would be justified, provided the plaintiffs' claims were substantiated by
an official discovery process. Thus, in accordance with rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Judge Weinfeld could not simply dismiss the case.41 Weinfeld had found the plaintiff's
personal accounts of their treatment by police agents sufficiently convincing to merit further
investigation by the court to determine if they were examples of a system of abuse.
Weinfeld choice to rule on plaintiffs' behalf rested on their presentation of specific harms
produced by police tactics, particularly regarding their claim that CPP tactics had produced a “chilly”
atmosphere, causing them to restrict the exercise of their rights to avoid persecution. In weighing this
issue, Weinfeld considered the case of Laird v. Tatum, decided by the Supreme Court only months
before, on March 27, 1972.42 Weinfeld recalled that, in Laird,
the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs' allegations that the mere existence of the Army system of
surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian activity chilled the exercise of their First
Amendment rights did not present a justiciable controversy in the absence of a showing of
objective harm or a threatened future harm.
However, Weinfeld also considered that Handschu differed from Laird in the severity and the
specificity of its plaintiffs' accusations. In Laird, the surveillance by US Army agents had been limited
to reviewing publicly available records and openly attending public meetings. In contrast, the
41Handschu, October 24, 1972. These were the same rules whose adoption Horowitz had credited with the beginning of the
greater era of court activism which the Warren Court later accelerated. Without these rules, Murphy's request to dismiss the
case would likely have succeeded. Thus, this is yet another area in which the Handschu case relied on the era in which it
was first brought. Horowitz, “Decreeing Organizational Change,” 1271.
42Laird had been decided 5-4 against the civilian plaintiffs, in an effort led by conservative Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Burger. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).

Handschu plaintiffs had presented specific instances of far worse abuses, particularly the account of the
police infiltration of the V&R that led to its members leaving the organization. These actions had, in
Weinfeld's words, brought the plaintiffs' “complaint beyond the pale of [Laird v.] Tatum.” Judge
Weinfeld thus decreed in his 1972 decision that the plaintiffs' accusations merited further investigation
and ordered a formal discovery process.43
Though this discovery process could not reveal the details of specific CPP operations, it did
begin to uncover the staggering scope of the organization behind them. Plaintiffs learned that “at one
point in the litigation, SSD files contained the names of more than one million individuals,” and that,
even after extensive internal purges, “thousands of individuals were apparently still named in SSD
dossiers.”44 In addition, the SSD had maintained hundreds of thousands of case files and more than a
million index cards on individuals. SSD had monitored labor disputes and political campaigns through
its “extremist desk” and African Americans via a “Black desk.”45 The overwhelming majority of these
people had broken no laws and were investigated simply because they or their associates had acted in
ways that the police mistrusted. These abuses were not the result of isolated incidents of misbehavior
by rogue officers. The plaintiffs' suspicions of a massive, systemic CPP campaign had been proven
true. However, this victory was incredibly hard won. Class recognition had only come on May 25,
1979, after a bitter seven-year struggle during which the defendants' had demonstrated their willingness
and ability to fight a war of attrition, challenging plaintiffs on every possible technicality including by
using semantic arguments.46 The case's immense scope also certainly prolonged these proceedings.
Though Judge Weinfeld had initiated the long discovery process of 1972-1979, the role of
evaluating the information it presented, and of presiding over the Handschu case, was transferred from
43Handschu, 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
44Handschu v. Special Services Division, LEXIS 12148 1979 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
45Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within, 45.
46Two examples include claiming that the use of the word “threatened” in the class definition required the need for
psychological evaluation of the plaintiffs and that, according to their grammatical reading of the settlement, the current
plaintiff counselors would have to remain in their positions for life. These are examples not of constructive but obstructive
questions. Handschu, LEXIS 12148 1979 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

Judge Weinfeld to Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. after Haight's 1976 appointment as judge of New York's
Southern District by President Gerald Ford. Judge Haight had little direct experience in the world of
police reform. Instead, since his 1955 graduation from Yale Law School, Haight had operated
exclusively within the field of maritime law, including two years with the Admiralty and Shipping
Section of the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., followed
by 19 years with the New York firm of Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens. Though he had served as a
maritime commercial arbitrator, he had never held a judgeship before 1976. However, Haight now took
the helm of the Handschu case and has retained his position as presiding judge up to the present day.47
Haight's mammoth opinions within the Handschu case brim with personality and wit and demonstrate
his unusual willingness to walk readers through his decision making process while openly admitting
that other interpretations are possible.
In his first act as Handschu's presiding judge, Haight finally recognized a Handschu class. Like
Judge Weinfeld's decision not to dismiss the Handschu case, Judge Haight's decision relied on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in this case, Federal Rule 23(a). Haight judged that the class was
sufficiently numerous and that its members shared a single claim that the NYPD’s various actions were
unconstitutional. Per discovery, the NYPD had admitted that it had files on at least eight of the named
plaintiffs and 10 of the named organizations, making the plaintiffs sufficiently representative of the
proposed class. The plaintiffs sued for the rights of “Panther and Klansman alike.” Thus, in accordance
with Federal Rule 23 (a), Haight chose to recognize a Handschu class consisting of:
all individuals engaged in lawful political, religious, educational, or social activities and
were subjected to, or threatened by, infiltration, physical and verbal coercion,
photographic, electronic and physical surveillance, provocation of violence, recruitment
to act as police informers, and dossier collection and dissemination by the police… [via]
(1) Use of Informers; (2) infiltration; (3) interrogation; (4) overt surveillance; (5)
summary punishment; (6) intelligence gathering; and (7) electronic surveillance.48

47 “Biography – Senior Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr.,” USCourts.
48Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

This definition closely resembled that which the plaintiffs had originally declared in 1971, a
considerable accomplishment vs the NYPD's venerable CPP apparatus. However, since 1971, the
plaintiffs had chosen to remove the positive statement that the defendants had, through their CPP
program, violated their rights to privacy, free speech, and association.49 This single substantive change
demonstrated a greater shift within the plaintiffs' goals for the case. They had given up on securing a
positive ruling of unconstitutionality. This decision would change the course of the Handschu case.
From its open-ended lists of plaintiffs and defendants to its many accusations of constitutional
violation to its sweeping demands for court interference with the NYPD's operations, Handschu v.
Special Services Division was in every regard a product of the pro-activist legal culture of its birth. If
these trends had continued until at least 1979, its plaintiffs may well have prevailed. However, this era
was rapidly aging in 1971 and, during what Judge Haight described as the “rather extensive discovery”
process of 1972-1979, it ended quite definitively. As the legal and political climate changed, and in the
face of continual resistance by defendants, the Handschu plaintiffs realized that their case was in
serious trouble, like a hothouse rose clinging to survival in an increasingly hostile environment.

II. Half a Loaf is Better Than None: Why the Handschu Plaintiffs Settled for Less
By the time Judge Haight finally recognized the Handschu class in 1979, the plaintiffs had
already reduced the scope of their goals within the case dramatically. Instead of pursuing a ruling
against the defendants, they now planned to settle with them, and, to make this compromise possible,
the plaintiffs were willing to abandon their ambitious original demands. The plaintiffs and their legal
team knew that a settlement would offer a weaker defense against CPP. Still, they believed that, under
pressure from outside developments, settlement was now their best option. Particularly obstructive was
49Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

the newly conservative character of the Supreme Court under Justice Warren Burger, whose 1976
decision against the plaintiffs of Rizzo v. Goode had shaken the legal foundations on which the
Handschu case rested. In fact, Judge Haight believed Rizzo's federalist precedent, which argued that a
federal court had exceeded its authority by interfering with the operations of the Philadelphia Police
Department, to have doomed any injunctive ruling Handschu might produce. Unwilling to challenge
the Supreme Court, Haight refused to write any opinion that Rizzo might overturn. With Haight now
unwilling to support an eventual injunction against the defendants, plaintiffs chose to approach the
defendants, who had their own reasons to desire settlement. The two legal teams reached an agreement
in 1981, a mere 22 months after Haight's 1979 recognition of the Handschu class. This temporary
alliance between plaintiffs and defendants solidified Handschu's form and allowed the case to weather
the resistance of a body of rogue Handschu class members who opposed its conciliatory terms and
whose efforts delayed Haight's recognition of the settlement until 1985. For better or worse, the choice
to settle changed the Handschu case forever.
Though the legal system had still been a popular avenue for activism when Handschu began, a
few legal scholars began, in the 1970s, to seriously question the actual effectiveness of this tactic and
even the legacy of Brown itself. One of these skeptics, Donald L. Horowitz, questioned whether
individual judges' narrow experience within the legal field left them equal to their new task of writing
policy and managing local institutions.50 Another skeptic, whose controversial stance on civil rights
litigation was born from decades of personal experience including five years as an NAACP Legal
Defense Fund attorney, was legal scholar Derrick Bell. Bell had become increasingly critical of the
efficacy of Brown and the NAACP's strategy of ending segregation by fighting to uphold the Brown
decision.51 Though plaintiff counsel's and Judge Haight's subsequent decisions do not demonstrate
50The plaintiffs may also have been attracted to settlement because using similar measures to reform local institutions
without a definitive court ruling was very popular within the legal culture of the time. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational
Change, 1284.
51Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2004, 3. Bell's complaints about the movement's past and present as well as his warnings about
its future have since become highly influential within legal scholarship, forming the basis behind the legal field of “Critical

whether they were aware of Horowitz or Bell, these two outsiders offer perspectives which place the
next phase of the Handschu case in context.
The overall terms of the settlement which the Handschu plaintiffs and defendants reached
reveals just how dramatically the former had abandoned their original ambitions for systemic change.
The format of settlement itself eliminated most of the plaintiffs' original 1971 demands. Gone was the
demand for a court declaration that SSD's mandate was “overbroad and unconstitutional.”52 This sort of
declaration would lie outside the bounds of a settlement, where the judge would not be able to assign
culpability.53 Gone too was the request that the court order all political dossiers and other similar
documents in police control turned over to them for inspection. Furthermore, the Handschu settlement
would specifically deny class members any forms of relief beyond the creation of the Handschu
authority.54
However, the settlement also contained several genuinely new measures which, if followed,
promised to protect the constitutional liberties of CPP targets, at least to a point. It created the
“Handschu Guidelines,” a set of regulations intended to govern when and how the NYPD was allowed
to collect, retain, and disseminate information and how NYPD intelligence operations could be run. It
created the “Handschu authority,” a board composed of two NYPD employees and one civilian
“appointed by the mayor in consultation with the Police Commissioner for a term revocable at will” to
monitor the NYPD's compliance with the guidelines.55 According to the guidelines, the NYPD's
intelligence division could pursue CPP only after providing the Handschu authority with an

Race Theory. Jelani Cobb, “The Man Behind Critical Race Theory, The New Yorker, September 13, 2021.
52Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 4.
53Plaintiff counsel never secured any admission of culpability or wrongdoing from the NYPD or defense counsel during
Handschu's entire history. In all future cases where a declaration of culpability by either the court or the department was on
the table, defense counsel would go to any lengths to prevent such a statement from being made. Handschu v. Special
Services Division, No. 71CIV.2203 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
54Judge Weinfeld's original ruling might allow further injunctive relief if plaintiff counsel could point to a “pattern of
unconstitutional conduct, of which defendants should have been aware.” However, the court would never issue a single
injunction in Handschu's history despite uncovering several such patterns. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
55These personnel were the NYPD's First Deputy Commissioner and its Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters.
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

“investigation statement” proving that their operation would prevent specific pending criminal activity
by their proposed target (individual or group). If granted approval, INTEL would be allowed to
investigate for a 30-day period. To renew the investigation for a further 60 days, they would need to
demonstrate that this too was necessary.56
The settlement also created mechanisms of limited redress for class members. Any New Yorker
could request an inquiry by the Handschu authority to determine if they or an organization they were
affiliated with had been named in an NYPD intelligence file. INTEL would then be required to reveal
to the authority if such a file existed, a fact which the authority would report to the inquirer. If the
authority found that a file’s acquisition or retention had violated the guidelines, they would initiate a
full inquiry and produce a report to the police commissioner who would “initiate disciplinary measures
as [he deemed] appropriate.” Finally, the authority would notify the person or group and grant them the
right to inspect the documents, provided that this would not seriously threaten the life or safety of an
individual or reveal an ongoing investigation. To further record compliance, the guidelines required
yearly internal reviews of PSS files, submitting a report to the authority, who would produce a
summary and pass it on to the mayor via the commissioner.57
The effectiveness of this settlement will be discussed in Section III of this thesis. Before
covering the decision's subsequent history, however, I will discuss the motivating factors which drove
the plaintiffs, defendants, and judge to pursue settlement. The Handschu plaintiffs and their legal
counselors were not satisfied with the settlement they eventually approved because they felt it overly
favored the defendants by failing to establish a truly independent review process. The Guidelines
allowed INTEL to continue CPP operations, provided they followed its rules while doing so. However,
because the settlement lacked any practical mechanisms to compel the NYPD to comply with its terms
or to punish the department for violating them, this cooperation would be voluntary. Abuses could still

56Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
57Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

occur. As plaintiff counselor Paul Chevigny notably complained, “the sad fact is that none of the
compromises is entirely satisfactory; a strict investigative standard, an independent warranting body,
and an independent reviewing body are needed.”58 However, the plaintiff side still decided to accept
settlement.
In contrast to the plaintiffs, Judge Haight was largely satisfied that the “investigative statement”
system would provide a sufficient “paper-trail” to allow these abuses to be uncovered by the court,
should this be necessary. He also retained faith that embedding the Handschu settlement within be a
court order would force the defendants to respect it, helping to make up for the lack of external review.
Haight was influenced by Judge Getzendanner's decision of Alliance to End Repression v. City of
Chicago, a sister case to Handschu brought in response to the Chicago Police Department's
assassination of civil rights leader Fred Hampton. Haight quoted Getzendanner's claim that “‘the
character of the settlement as an injunction enforceable by the court’ is ‘more important than any
internal enforcement mechanism.'”59 Haight also disregarded the Handschu plaintiffs' worry that the
two police representatives within the Handschu authority would abuse their majority status, approving
violatory investigations by overruling the authority's single civilian member. Haight refused “to assume
that Mayor Koch (or his successor if he has one) would knowingly appoint a complaisant, silent booby
to an important body whose work may be subject to court review.” Thus, in such a case, the civilian
member, no booby, would surely act as a “whistle-blower”, notifying the public of this abuse.60
However, Haight too admitted that the plaintiffs' ability to secure an independent review process was
“very much in doubt” under current law.61 To understand why, we must explore a ruling which heavily
influenced Judge Haight decision: a case which had ended in 1976 known as Rizzo v. Goode.

58Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

59Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
60Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
61Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Though the Warren Court had won the support of both activists and ordinary citizens of many
different backgrounds, they had also become extremely unpopular among a significant number of
Americans. Brown and other cases associated with the Civil Rights Movement famously inspired
serious push-back by white segregationists. Decisions associated with what has been called the
“Criminal Procedure Revolution” such as Mapp v. Ohio (1961) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966) may
have been even more unpopular, particularly among police officers, but within the general public as
well. Legal Scholar Corinna Barrett Lain notes that, according to several national polls, only one in
three Americans approved of the Miranda decision, which forced police officers to remind arrestees of
their rights. These decisions and others helped make the Warren Court, in Lain's words, “quite possibly
the most vilified Supreme Court in United States history” as many Americans, particularly middle-class
whites came to believe that the Warren Court had helped to enable a political unrest, disorder, and
crime. In the mid 1960s, conservative politicians had attempted to appeal to this population by
attacking the court and its decisions within their campaign rhetoric. Richard Nixon called out Miranda
by name in his campaign for “law and order.”62 After winning the 1969 election, he immediately
followed up on his campaign promise to excise liberal judicial activism from the Supreme Court by
replacing its aging liberal justices with conservatives and appointed Warren Burger to replace the
retiring Earl Warren as Chief Justice.63 The swift departures, by death or retirement, of three other
justices, allowed Nixon to appoint conservatives Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William
Rehnquist by January, 1972.64 Thus, by the time Judge Weinfeld granted the Handschu plaintiffs'
request for discovery, four justices upon whose support they closely relied were gone.
The sudden appointment of four conservative justices produced an initially slow growth of
conservative decisions. Historian James T. Patterson argues that Chief Justice Burger bided his time to
62Corinna Barrett Lain, “Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure
Revolution,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 152, no. 4 (2004), 1363-1364, 1399-1400.
63Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education, 147.
64Patterson observes this shift in the realm of school desegregation efforts. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education, 182183.

avoid apparent political motivation and even produced a trickle of liberal decisions, furthering Warren's
progressive path. Patterson also emphasizes that the Burger Court did not act as a rouge conservative
force but instead followed a rightward drift within white public opinion. Regardless, by the mid 1970s,
the court had begun to move steadily rightward, dismantling its predecessor's pro-interference project.
Instead, the Burger Court championed tradition, and, above all, federalism (the ideal of local autonomy
from federal interference).65 The Burger Court's reversal of Rizzo v. Goode was a expression of their
greater battle to undo the Warren Court's legacy.
Rizzo closely resembled Handschu and Alliance. Its plaintiffs had sued in an attempt to force the
court to interfere with their local police department, in this case, the Philadelphia Police Department,
which they accused of violating federal law by “discouraging the filing of civilian complaints and...
minimizing the consequences of pervasive police brutality.” Rizzo's presiding Judge had decided in
their favor, ruling that the PPD had enabled unconstitutional behavior by individual officers and
awarded significant relief to the plaintiffs in the form of new guidelines governing police behavior.66
However, the court had failed to establish a “conscious” department policy to violate constitutional
rights.67
Once Rizzo's defendants appealed the case to the Supreme Court, a majority of five justices,
including Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist, voted to strike it down.68 Rehnquist, who wrote Rizzo's
majority opinion, had fought against everything Warren had fought for. He had written an infamous
memo opposing Brown v. Board of Education in 1952 and in 1964 had worked on the presidential
campaign to elect Barry Goldwater, a conservative whose strategy of appealing to whites resentful of
65Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education, 149-153.
66Though he notably rejected the plaintiff's request for comprehensive civilian review as too “extreme”, Rizzo's presiding
judge approved an injunction creating “a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints.” He
hoped this system would protect Philadelphians from future violations of their rights and spur further institutional reform.
Ann Althouse, Ann Althouse, “How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power,” Harvard Law Review
100, 1485 (1987).
67L. M. G. “Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for Police Misconduct” Virginia Law Review 62, no. 7 (November 1976):
1259-1283. 1261.
68Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

progressive reforms had inspired Nixon's campaign. Rehnquist hoped to use his Rizzo decision to
further the aims he had pursued for decades.
Rehnquist placed his authority as a Supreme Court justice behind an argument which, as
intended, would prove devastating to the efforts of the Handschu plaintiffs. His central argument served
to dismiss the Rizzo plaintiffs' claim that their abuse at the hands of individual officers indicated the
existence of a system of abuse. As Commissioner Murphy had claimed in 1971, Rehnquist argued that
acts of police misbehavior were isolated incidents and that, because higher-ranking police officers had
simply allowed these incidents to occur without actively supporting them, the PPD was not at fault.
Thus, he ruled that the lower court had exceeded its authority by holding the PPD responsible and
forcing them to make internal changes.69 Rehnquist also reinterpreted 42 U.S.C § 1983, the statute
around which the Rizzo plaintiffs, as well as their Handschu counterparts, had based their suits.
Rehnquist completely ignored the precedent set by the Warren Court's liberal interpretation of [1983] in
Monroe v. Pape. Instead, he raised the standard that future plaintiffs would have to satisfy before suing.
To satisfy [1983], plaintiffs would now need to demonstrate not only deliberate violations of their
rights by state actors but also an “affirmative” policy that had intentionally guided this abuse from
above.70 Rehnquist argued that the Rizzo plaintiffs had failed to prove the existence of such a policy, he
could not sustain the lower court's ruling in their favor.71
The announcement of the Rizzo decision had an immediate effect on the legal community. A
contemporary legal scholar writing under the moniker L.M.G. argued that the entire Rizzo opinion
69L.M.G., “Rizzo v. Goode,” 1271.
70Rehnquist's demand that plaintiffs demonstrate police leadership's intention to violate plaintiffs' rights closely resembles
the Burger Court's reasoning within decisions assailing the desegregation of public schools. In decisions including San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) and Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the Burger Court noted that
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate systematic intent by the school boards to violate their rights. Thus, they could not allow
the federal court system to interfere with their local autonomy. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education, 177-180. Both
decisions were supported by Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Milliken v. Bradly, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
71Seeming to defy the conservative power block within the Burger Court, Justice Blackmun voted to uphold the lower
court's ruling of the Rizzo case and wrote the official dissent. Blackmun questioned Burger's abandonment of Monroe v.
Pape and argued that Rizzo was a rare case in which local abuses merited federal intervention. L.M.G., “Rizzo v. Goode,”
1263.

served as a sustained attack on court activism, calling the opinion “a product of the present court's
disposition to test all varieties of litigation against state officials against a revived and expanding
doctrine of federalism.”72 Rehnquist's opinion featured a coda in which he departed from legal specifics
of Rizzo to pontificate further in favor of a federalist legalism, claiming that local “government has
traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs” and that, during
a suit against a state institution over constitutional violations, “principles of equity... militate heavily
against the grant of an injunction except in the most extraordinary circumstances.”73 However, even
sections that did not mention federalism by name served federalist purposes. For example, Rehnquist
used vague definitions to force local courts to interpret his decision's proscriptions, refusing to explain
what he meant by an “affirmative” policy of abuse or to define the “permissible scope of federal
injunctive relief against state officials.” Of course, this practice also allowed Rehnquist to control local
decisions by defining these terms ex post facto, allowing him to strike down interpretations by lower
courts that he did not agree with.74
After a ruling like Rizzo, L.M.G. was not the only person who found it “difficult to predict
under what circumstances, if any, a future case in any way resembling Rizzo could succeed.”75 The
plaintiffs of Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago seem to have agreed, as they avoided the
Rizzo precedent by accepting a settlement that was approved in 1981.76 Presiding Judge Susan
Getzendanner directly articulated the probability of a police appeal, writing that “The City of Chicago
Defendants have made plain their intention to contend at trial that the Chicago Police Department
should not be run by injunction.”77 In New York, Judge Charles Haight certainly agreed that Rizzo
72L. M. G., “Rizzo v. Goode,” 1281-1282.
73 Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
74L.M.G., “Rizzo v. Goode,” 1976.
75L.M.G., “Rizzo v. Goode,” 1281-1282.
76Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
77Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Historian Trevor George Gardner argues that outright refusal by local
police departments to obey federal legal mandates, or, as he calls the practice, “Police Federalism,” has actually been the
norm in US history. He writes that “Americans within and outside of the political and juridical fields have flatly rejected
federal policies that would make state and local police subordinate to the federal executive.... for more than two centuries.”
This argument indicates that the pressures Judge Haight wrote about were far from new. However, in the example of

seriously threatened legal activism against police departments, later arguing that Rehnquist's decision
had produced a “substantial” threat that “class plaintiffs… may prove all their claims of abuse… and
still have broad form, future mandatory injunctive relief denied them on the ground that a federal
equity court cannot intrude to that decree in to the discretionary activities of state or local authorities.”78
With an injunction off the table, Haight argued that a settlement would best serve the interests
of the Handschu class and all but refused to produce a ruling that would challenge the Rizzo decision as
he interpreted it. However, in an unusual turn, Haight admitted that he had chosen to interpret Rizzo's
text broadly rather than narrowly to produce a reading that supported his choice to confirm the
settlement. Haight noted that, in the main body of his decision, Rehnquist had placed weight on the fact
that the lower Rizzo court had failed to establish an “affirmative” policy supporting a system that
violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. However, the Handschu discovery process had uncovered
considerable evidence indicating such a pattern. For example, the SSD's official charter within the
NYPD's rules and procedures proved that, among other reasons, it had been established “to investigate
labor disputes;.... [and] to maintain files on persons arrested or seizures made in connection with a
communistic disturbance and the distribution of anarchistic or other unlawful literature of such
nature.”79 The Handschu plaintiffs had specifically called this charter “unconstitutional.” Information
revealed later arguably indicated that SSD had used this charter to justify unconstitutional acts.80 Had
he chosen to, Haight could have ruled that evidence did indicate an official policy, theoretically
satisfying Rehnquist's interpretation of [1983].
Despite these factors, Haight admitted to choosing a broad interpretation, based primarily on
Rehnquist's federalist expounding within Rizzo's coda, that he read as a threat to strike down any
injunction for violating federalist principles, regardless of its specifics. Unwilling to take this risk,
Handschu, the police's “federalism” was also supported by the weight of Rehnquist's decision of Rizzo. Trevor George
Gardner, “Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History of Police Federalism,” Columbia Law Review 119, no.
1 (January 2019).
78Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
79Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 3-4.
80Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within, 45.

Haight argued that a settlement would better serve the public interest than an injunction which could
easily be struck down from above by Rehnquist's almighty pen.81 The Handschu plaintiffs and their
attorneys would certainly have been aware of the Rizzo decision, which likely contributed to their
choice to settle. The timing of their choice to alter their goals seems to indicate that Rizzo may have
been a deciding factor. However, whatever their views, they lacked the power to overcome Haight's
refusal to challenge Rehnquist. If he was unwilling to challenge the Supreme Court, there was nothing
they could do.
Given that the Rizzo precedent likely ensured that the defendants would prevail in an all-out
legal battle, their approval of a settlement may seem surprising. In fact, the legal and political context
surrounding the Handschu case gave the defendants two broad but solid reasons to favor settlement.
First, the CPP project had so effectively countered the widespread political efforts of the 1960s that the
NYPD could afford to let it go. In the eight years since the suit had begun, the NYPD had continued to
use covert tactics to mop up the underground remnants of the anti-racist and anti-war movements. The
NYPD had also reframed its use of covert tactics as part of the national “War on Crime”, a federally
guided and funded project to target Black Americans as criminals regardless of their political
activities.82 Thus, by 1979, the NYPD had moved beyond their previous CPP tactics and thus out of
Handschu's reach.
The department's second motivation was that any settlement would benefit them directly in
specific ways. By settling, they could deny the plaintiff's legal team the more detailed discovery
process which a trial would have produced. While the limited discovery process that Judge Weinfeld
had ordered to weigh the plaintiffs' request for class status had been damaging, it had revealed only
general policies. A full court-mandated discovery would have uncovered and publicized specific CPP
operations, likely hurting the department's public image and possibly allowing the Handschu plaintiffs
to prevail. A strongly negative public reaction could even bring the issue of CPP into the wider political
81Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
82Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 207-208.

arena, possibly igniting a popular movement to demand changes. A settlement would allow the police
to avoid all these risks. The Rizzo decision had also empowered them to appeal any settlement which
they strongly opposed until they found a court which would use the Rizzo precedent to destroy it. This
would allow them to dictate the settlement's terms from a position of strength. Together, these factors
rendered settlement even more attractive to the NYPD than a trial in which they would almost certainly
be victorious. However, while reaching a settlement would serve their interests, obeying a settlement
would not. Their assent did not indicate any change of heart or mind on the efficacy or usefulness of
CPP by the defendants, as their subsequent actions would show.
In 1981, Handshcu's two legal teams reached their settlement and Judge Haight was prepared to
approve it without ruling whether the NYPD had violated the Constitution. Haight was satisfied that
general CPP policies, revealed by the affidavits of Commissioner Murphy and others, as well as the
original 1973 SSD guidelines, raised “an unmistakable red flag of potential, if not actual, constitutional
violations”83 and, while this was insufficient to support a ruling, it would serve to justify confirming a
settlement. However, some class members who were following the case's progress were very
unsatisfied with its terms. Thus, in the early 1980s, a diverse group of class members attempted to
change Handschu's direction, appealing to Judge Haight not to approve the settlement. These
“objectors”, as Haight collectively referred to them, lacked a truly unified vision for an alternative to
the settlement. However, they were very numerous, including representatives of 26 political and legal
organizations and 67 individuals including historians Howard Zinn and William Appleman Williams.
They had also secured veteran civil rights legal representatives and were unified by opposition to any
settlement allowing the NYPD to avoid the full scope of the discovery process, allowing their past CPP
operations to remain covered up.
Despite their ambitions, the objectors faced an impossible task. These mere class members
stood in direct opposition to the united front of their class representatives, counsels for the plaintiffs
83 Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

and the defendants, and Judge Haight himself, all of whom were committed to settlement. Without
support from within this hierarchy, they could not possibly succeed. However, the simple existence of
class members who opposed the proposed Handschu settlement raises important questions. First, it
indicated a serious division between the greater Handschu class and the professional legal team who
had proposed a settlement on their behalf without ever consulting them to learn thoughts on the case.
Now, a sizable group of class members had risen up to oppose this settlement.
In the 1970s, Bell had observed many similar divisions within the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund's attempts to uphold the Brown decision and come to believe that this issue threatened to
undermine not only specific cases but the entire anti-segregation project. In the early 1970s, Bell
observed that issues like bussing were dividing Black parents, many of whom questioned whether
integration alone would actually improve their children's education. Nonetheless, the NAACP had
deemed their clients' actual wishes less important than the greater goal which had motivated them to
sue and fought for integration despite growing opposition from many of their clients.84
The Handschu case mirrored this dynamic. Given the immense size of the class, it would of
course be very difficult to consult even a representative sample of the class about their understanding of
their interests. More importantly, the objectors' interests might contradict the goals of their selfappointed class representatives. To escape this difficult situation, Judge Haight quoted the decision of
Weinberger v. Kendrick to state that “there is 'an overriding public interest in favor of settlement,
especially in class actions, where 'a fair settlement need not satisfy every concern of the plaintiff
class'”. Thus, Haight felt it to be in the class's interest to override the wishes of its members and, in
1985 dismissed their complaints unilaterally.85 The objectors' attempted to appeal Haight's dismissal of
their concerns, but the second circuit court of the United States Court of Appeals was no more receptive
than Haight had been.86
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The existence of the Objectors also offered a challenge to the Plaintiffs and their legal team.
Imagine if the Handschu plaintiffs had chosen to pursue police reform through a traditional, nonlegalist political struggle. In this scenario, they would have had to appeal not to a judge but directly to
other victims of CPP. Such a movement would have needed to be self supporting, drawing its strength
from its members; from their numbers and their ability to vote, march, protest, and strike. Instead, these
activists chose the legal path, faithful of continued support from the Supreme Court. Once that court
was replaced, the Handschu plaintiffs had been forced to adapt to their new powerlessness, but they did
so in a peculiar way. Instead of fighting for great changes outside of a legal system which no longer
supported them, they gave up on change to pursue a limited, managerial settlement. By pursuing
communities' rights while ignoring those communities' individual needs and interests, they had cut
themselves off from their most powerful source of support: local political power, exactly the mistake
which Bell argued the NAACP had made.
This alienation from the actual interests of their class members ensured that, when the objectors
appeared, they opposed the plaintiffs. However, they also offered an opportunity to take the case in a
new direction. Here was a large group of class members, representing a long list of grassroots
organizations whose opposition to settlement was rooted in a deeper opposition to police espionage and
a desire to learn the truth. The Objectors constituted by far the largest public engagement with
Handschu in the case's history. Their engagement with the twelve-year-old case showed that the
political will existed to sustain old-style, non-legalist campaign. Here was an opportunity for the
Handschu plaintiffs to leave past failures behind and adapt their case to fill a support role within a
broader political movement for police reform. Bell had himself taken a much broader view of what a
social litigation could be, suggesting that “litigation can and should serve lawyer and client as a
community-organizing tool, an educational forum, a means of obtaining data, a method of exercising
political leverage, and a rallying point for public support.” Plaintiff counsel could have supported the
objectors by withdrawing their support for the settlement. Then, Haight would not have been able to

approve it, and clients could have secured the truth through a discovery process. Even if they
eventually failed to secure a positive ruling, they might have revitalized the greater movement against
CPP.
This was not to be, as the plaintiffs recommitted to a managerial settlement which, they hoped,
would protect New Yorkers from future CPP. Obviously, it is impossible to know what results this
counterfactual choice would have produced. However, By staying the course, plaintiff counsel ended
the possibility that Handschu could have become more than just a court case, that it could have helped
to trigger a greater political process by revealing the truth. By choosing the path of settlement, the
plaintiffs also ignored, to their peril, Bell's final warning, that litigation had not proved a reliable
avenue for securing rights directly, particularly when other roles are ignored in favor of pursuing a
narrow goal. Furthermore, without concerted support from the community, activists would not be able
to enforce even successful cases.
Ultimately, the objectors failed. They lacked the power to oppose the pro-settlement consensus
within the Handschu case. The Handschu settlement, sought since 1979, reached in 1981, and adopted
in 1985, was a settlement for, but not by, the people of New York. Haight was satisfied and asked all
class members to recall that “half a loaf is better than none.” However, the Handschu settlement, which
had easily withstood the efforts of the objectors, would prove less sturdy against police hostility than
Haight and plaintiff counsel had hoped. The settlement for which the Handschu plaintiffs had sacrificed
their time, effort, and ideals, would fail to protect the class in whose name, but without whose approval,
they had acted. For the NYPD, the Handschu settlement would never be more than an obstacle to
overcome or avoid.
III. An NYPD Much in Need of Some Discipline: The Silver Age of CPP
After fourteen years of legal battle and in the face of the Rizzo precedent, the Handschu
plaintiffs had traded their original goals for a compromise with the defendants. Both the plaintiffs and
Judge Haight had hoped that INTEL would work within the new regulations. After all, the guidelines

still allowed INTEL to conduct CPP operations, provided that they obeyed their terms. Instead, the
opposite occurred, as the NYPD increasingly refused to seek the Handshcu authority's approval for
CPP operations. According the the Handschu authority, the defendants failed to “act in accordance”
with the guidelines on several occasions after the settlement was approved, while repeatedly requesting
that Haight alter its terms to favor them further. Haight refused these initial requests, but the 9/11
attacks helped change his mind and, in 2003, he granted police demands to free CPP from court
oversight, making contempt rulings functionally impossible to grant, and crippling the Handschu
authority. INTEL used this freedom to immediately revive their pre-Handschu tactics, beginning a
silver age of CPP. All the abuses over which the Handschu plaintiffs had originally sued returned as
well. Once post-9/11 paranoia eventually died down and after the NYPD's vast espionage of Muslims
was revealed, the Handschu settlement was eventually revised for a second time in 2017. However,
despite a few largely cosmetic changes, the revised settlement left Handschu more reliant on the
voluntary cooperation of the mayor and the police than the 1985 settlement had been.
Judge Haight was initially optimistic about the future of the Handschu settlement. Upon
approving the Handschu settlement, Haight had converted it into a federal consent decree, essentially a
court order. This empowered the settlement by allowing Haight the right to hold the defendants in
contempt of court for violating it. In 1987, Haight ordered the authority to investigate claims raised by
news articles that the NYPD had revived banned CPP tactics. The authority's October 8, 1987 report
revealed that they had uncovered several guideline violations which they simply referred to as
“inappropriate” and recommended the department avoid such behavior in the future. Haight accepted
this classification, refusing to grant plaintiff counsel's request cor a contempt ruling. Haight hoped that
these early instances of “inappropriate” behavior were simply “uncertainties in implementation” and
treated them as the NYPD's growing pains as it adjusted to a settlement that had seriously altered its
operations.87
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However, aspects of this incident pointed towards deeper issues. One was that the Handschu
authority seemed unable to remain neutral in its dealings with the NYPD. In their report, they had
requested that Haight alter the terms of the settlement by returning some of their regulatory
responsibilities to the NYPD to correct “worrying” ambiguities in the settlement's terms. For example,
they claimed, bafflingly, to be unsure if sending police agents to secretly monitor political meetings
was actually prohibited by the Handschu Guidelines. The authority then proposed that Judge Haight
resolve such “ambiguities” by allowing them to approve any operation which the NYPD claimed would
pursue undefined “related operational responsibilities” to protect “community affairs.” Defense counsel
immediately echoed this request.88 Haight refused these requests, which he felt would have hamstrung
the settlement by allowing the defendants to decide for themselves if their own operations were
constitutional.
Haight's faith in the defendants was further shaken two years later. A May 22, 1990 court
memorandum reveals that members of the New York City Civil Rights Coalition (NYCCRC) had
accused the NYPD of covertly monitoring their 1987 meetings. At their request, the Handschu
authority investigated and confirmed these suspicions, revealing that “officers from the NYPD
Intelligence Division attended five of the Coalition’s six public meetings… without revealing their
identity; [and] that [the] three documents [produced] … ‘were not prepared in conformity with the
Handschu guidelines.’” Haight worried that these actions against the NYCRC raised “serious questions
concerning compliance.” Still, while he granted the Coalition's request for a full investigation by the
authority, Haight again refused to hold defendants in contempt.89
Haight may have been reluctant to admit that the settlement he approved had failed. However,
perhaps it is more accurate to say that Haight had failed the settlement by refusing to enforce it.
NYPD's covert operation against the NYCCRC had illustrated perhaps the settlement's greatest
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weakness: because it lacked any internal consequences for violation, the defendants had no reason to
accept it. The late Leonard Levitt, a veteran police reporter who covered the NYPD for decades, wrote
that, rather than adjusting to a state of compliance, the NYPD moved further away from the settlement
over time, eventually avoiding all interactions with the Handschu authority. Handschu's mere existence
seemed to make NYPD commanders so uncomfortable that, by 2002, none of the department heads,
including the new commander of INTEL, seemed to understand the settlement's terms at all. According
to Levitt, commanders had blamed Handschu for restricting
their investigations into such groups as an Albanian burglary ring, Hell's Angels or the
gang of Sayyid Al Nosair, who was convicted of assassinating Rabbi Meir Kahane. Yet
when questioned, the commanders acknowledge they never went to Handschu for
approval. “It was the specter of Handschu,” one of the commanders wrote. “The Legal
Bureau said that my requests did not fall within the guidelines.” Yet two former top
department officials familiar with Handschu say the authority never blocked any
legitimate criminal investigations.... A former top commander familiar with Handschu
matters said: “The mindset became, 'Because of Handschu don't investigate.'
This refusal to cooperate with the Handschu authority perhaps explains why no Handschu cases made
it to Judge Haight's desk between 1990 and 2002. The Handschu settlement had reduced CPP, but not
in the manner that its plaintiffs had hoped.
By the late 1990s, most commanders never considered actually running political operations
through the Handschu apparatus.90 Instead, they simply wanted Handschu changed. As the early 2001
modification of Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago demonstrated, such things were
possible.91 In 1999, a local court had refused the city of Chicago's request to alter the Alliance
settlement. However, the city appealed this decision and a higher court approved the city's request on
the grounds that Alliance interfered with counter-terrorist investigations. It is highly probable that the
Handschu defendants would have again attempted to alter or overturn the Handschu settlement early in

90Leonard Levitt, “Guidelines often misunderstood,” NYPD Confidential, October 7, 2002.
91Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 1:74-cv-03268 (N.D. III. 1974).

the 21st century on the same grounds and that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 simply
accelerated this process.
Though the Handschu defendants had fought for years to Haight over, the three who at last
accomplished this goal were Micheal Bloomberg, who had won the 2002 mayoral election by only two
percentage points, Police Commissioner and NYPD veteran Ray Kelly, and the former career CIA
analyst Kelly chose to head the NYPD's post-9/11 Intelligence division, David Cohen. Despite having
worked in New York, as station chief of the local CIA office, and at Langley, as the Agency's Deputy
Director of Intelligence, Cohen had no experience with policing. However, he had very specific plans
for NYPD INTEL.92 As director, he wanted to act freely and preemptively, sans interference from
politicians, courts, or the people of New York. The fact that Cohen identified the Handschu settlement
as the primary obstacle in his path may be the clearest indication that it had in fact offered at least some
protection to New Yorkers' civil liberties. However, thanks to Cohen, it would not do so for much
longer.
Cohen and Kelly could likely have requested Handschu be struck down. Instead, they bent it to
serve their own purposes with Haight's assistance.93 In 2002, Cohen bypassed class counsel and
approached Haight directly. His argument recalled Commissioner Murphy's. After the 9/11 attacks,
Cohen argued, turbulence had returned, and the city had to be allowed to respond to defend the public.
New York was on the brink of destruction by an unknowable number of Muslim domestic terrorists.
Living seemingly ordinary lives, these terrorists had evaded police attention because they were too
careful to leave the kinds of evidence required to justify a police investigation under the Handschu
settlement. Thus, “the continued enforcement of the Guidelines no longer consistent with the public
interest” because “In the case of terrorism, to wait for an indication of a crime before investigating is to
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wait far too long.”94 In short, Cohen argued that, in a post-9/11 city, the Constitution was the problem
and deregulating the NYPD was the cure.95
Haight immediately accepted Cohen's narrative and granted his request within a year. Though
he realized that altering the Handschu settlement might leave constitutional liberties vulnerable, Haight
accepted Cohen's claim that refusal or delay might cost innocent lives. Naturally, class counsel
attempted to resist, pointing out that Cohen had failed to cite a single specific police investigation
which the Handschu guidelines had hindered.96 However, Haight's mind was made up and he countered
by claiming that, since plaintiff counsel had failed to prove that the settlement would never interfere
with a potential future investigation, he had to grant Cohen's request. In 1985, he had believed there to
be an overwhelming public interest in the settlement. In 2003, he believed he could best serve the
public by dismantling it.97
Haight tailored the Handschu settlement to match Cohen's specifications bu deleting most of its
existing language. Most importantly, Haight cut the language requiring that the NYPD conduct CPP
operations in accordance with the guidelines in the first place. Some of Cohen's subsequent requests
were specific, such as removing the listed definitions of “undercover” and “investigator,” allowing
Cohen to use such agents freely and secretly.98 Some were more general, such as Cohen's suggestion
that the guidelines no longer be the standard by which compliance with the settlement would be judged.
Instead, he promised that the police department would comply with the US Constitution, a document
lacking the specific protections against CPP which the Handschu guidelines had contained. Haight
complied. The Handschu authority lost their ability to veto investigations and would only be allowed to
pass concerns on to Judge Haight if they believed an operation had violated the Constitution, rather
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than the guidelines.99 In turn, Judge Haight would only be allowed to find the NYPD in contempt if
class counsel could show specific evidence of a broad pattern of behavior by the NYPD to intentionally
violate the Constitution, terms of which Rehnquist would surely have approved.100 Even the civilian
document request system was paired back, as class members would now receive redress only if a file or
investigation in which they were named violated the Constitution according to the Handschu authority.
In return for these changes, Cohen promised to include the FBI's newly “updated” guidelines in
the NYPD's patrol handbook. However, the FBI's guidelines had themselves been recently rewritten to
legalize nearly any conceivable CPP tactic and their language made it difficult to imagine
circumstances in which the NYPD could ever be punished for violating them. All efforts to monitor and
enforce the department's compliance with the rules would be internal and most “rules” were paired with
loopholes allowing the police to bypass them at will.101 Additionally, most of the patrol guidelines
increased the NYPD's power rather than controlling it.102
Haight was free to make these changes because, in interpreting the law, he answered to no
authority aside from higher courts. In 1985, Haight had chosen an interpretation of the Rizzo precedent
allowing him to support settlement over trial. In 1987, he chose to reject police requests to alter that
settlement because, in his interpretation, it was in the public good. Now, in 2003, Haight adopted
Cohen's interpretation of events, granted his requests, and backed up this choice with an interpretation
of the law which no parties within the case could question. He sidelined class counsel as easily as he
had the objectors, a blow which reduced their power such that, in future, defense counsel would treat
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them as third parties to ignore rather than as opponents who could be bargained with.103 Where a
legislative regulation might have at least required a public debate or some process before a change of
such magnitude, Judge Haight faced no oversight whatsoever.104 However, while Haight's decisions had
not required the approval or permission of plaintiffs, attorneys, or class members, their text had at least
been publicly available. By approving Cohen's changes, Haight had handed all his control over CPP to
the man in charge of CPP operations, a man whose decisions would now be kept secret from the public
and from Haight himself.
Cut off from all direct knowledge of the NYPD's actions, Haight had lost all awareness, and
thus all control, over the NYPD's intelligence operations. Judge Haight had also given up his ability to
hold the defendants in contempt, having raised the standards of proof so high that plaintiff counsel
could not possibly satisfy them. Thus, between 2003 and 2017, the defendants won several victories in
court and became ever more brazen outside the courtroom. Mere days after Haight approved the altered
guidelines, INTEL politically interrogated several protesters arrested at the massive anti-war protest of
December 15, 2003. Haight was shocked, writing that the fiasco demonstrated that the NYPD was “in
need of some discipline.” Yet, having surrendered his power to interfere, Haight backed down, neither
condemning the NYPD's acts as unconstitutional105 nor accusing Kelly or Cohen of any wrongdoing
beyond expressing that they “should have known” that these actions would be taken. Haight was
similarly helpless after several subsequent incidents of police CPP.106 Defense counsel soundly defeated
several attempts to hold their clients in contempt of court, even winning a ruling from Judge Haight
that made subsequent contempt requests from plaintiff counsel even more difficult to grant.107 Defense
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counsel even lied to and manipulated plaintiff counsel without consequence.108 Plaintiff counsel would
not secure a lasting victory in court for fourteen years.
INTEL's actions during the silver age of CPP were revealed not by the Handschu authority, but
by a team of investigative journalists. Between August 24 and December 23, 2011, Matt Apuzzo and
Adam Goldman, assisted by Eileen Sullivan and Chris Hawley, published a series of articles via the
Associated Press revealing that INTEL's anti-terrorist intelligence operation had trampled on the
liberties of New York's Muslims.109 The AP team attracted attention through their bold yet data-driven
claims and their efforts won them the 2012 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Journalism. These highprofile stories drew attention to INTEL's actions, CPP, and, to some extent, Handschu v. Special
Services Division, and from 2011 and 2013, a robust body of interdisciplinary study was developed.
The Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC) interviewed 57 Muslim American New
Yorkers including “religious figures, youth, business owners, mosque-goers, professionals, and law
enforcement officers.” MACLC used their stories, shared under the condition of anonymity, to produce
“Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and its Impact on American Muslims,” a report revealing the steep
human cost of INTEL's post-2003 CPP project.110 CLEAR attorney and legal scholar Amna Akbar built
substantially on “Mapping Muslims” to produce “Policing 'Radicalization'”, another essential synthetic
work.111 Leonard Levitt returned to the subject of CPP and produced informative reporting of his
own.112 Finally, in the fall of 2013, Apuzzo and Goldman packaged their research and the findings of
other works including “Mapping Muslims” into Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD's Secret Spying Unit
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and Bin Laden's Final Plot Against America, a book which, though journalistic, remains an essential
synthesis of the NYPD's recent history of CPP.
Because the investigation statements which the NYPD submitted to the Handschu authority
before 2003 have never been made public, it is difficult to know if the adoption of the 1985 settlement
reduced the number of CPP operations. What is known is that, after Haight freed the department from
that settlement in 2003, the number of such operations skyrocketed, and Cohen quickly revived every
tactic over which the Handschu plaintiffs had first sued in 1971. To list a handful of examples, on
Cohen's watch, INTEL revived the aggressive recruitment of “Informants,” pressuring recent Muslim
immigrants and petty criminals into asking fellow Muslims about terrorism or political events and to
record their answers for police files, an old tactic revived under the rather on-the-nose title of “create
and capture.”113 INTEL used these informants to “Infiltrate” the Muslim Student Associations of six
CUNY public colleges114 and more than 100 mosques in the New York area.115 These infiltrations
constituted “Electronic Surveillance” as the police agents often wore bugs.116 Intel also practiced “Overt
Surveillance” by videotaping protesters,117 politically “Interrogated” them,118 and, according to a report
by the NYCLU, even subjected them to “Summary Punishment.”119 Finally, INTEL practiced
“Intelligence Gathering,” creating files on people whose speech, actions, or religion they found
suspicious.120
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2003 also marked the return of the indirect harms which CPP tactics had produced before 1985.
The NYPD again used CPP tactics against people based on their ethnic background. The new
Handschu Guidelines permitted NYPD investigations whenever a case involved the “possibility of
unlawful activity”121 and because he assumed young Muslim males might become future terrorists,
Cohen had used Handschu's new language to target New Yorkers from 28 Muslim majority
nationalities including “Black American Muslim.” As such, the Demographics Unit functioned as a
“Muslim desk” analogous to the “Black desk” INTEL had maintained until the 1970s.122 Under Cohen,
INTEL revived even older tactics including demographic maps of communities resembling maps the
NYPD had used during the Progressive era.123 As Apuzzo and Goldman point out, mission creep
returned as well. They list an instance in which an INTEL investigation of a Times Square bombing
grew to include trawling a blog which posted about the attack and even monitoring of liberal activist
groups connected to the blog's creator, with all people and groups involved ending up listed in an
INTEL database.124 Finally, these tactics revived a phenomenon key to the 1971 Handschu suit:
“Chill.”125 The new scholarship focuses particularly on the chill which CPP created in Muslim
communities, where many chose to severely restrict their speech, activity, and association to avoid
attracting police attention.126 Interviewees reported reducing their religiosity, avoiding contact with
fellow Muslims, and shaving their beards or giving up wearing religious clothing127 while Muslim
students restricted their political speech, chose technical (apolitical) majors and coursework, and
avoided joining Muslim Student Organizations.128
Handschu plaintiffs, plaintiff counsel, and Judge Haight remained oblivious to this new CPP
project until Apuzzo and Goldman broke the story in 2011. Because Haight had dismantled the
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apparatuses which were originally intended to uncover such abuses, the Handschu settlement had in
fact primarily served to support INTEL's efforts. Externally, police representatives used the case's
existence as a fig leaf to reassure the public that their rights were protected. On several occasions after
2003, Chief Kelly misleadingly claimed that, because every political operation was vetted by “a federal
judge,” meaning Haight, it was impossible for an NYPD operation to violate the Constitution. In 2012,
Micheal Silber, NYPD civilian director of NYPD “Intel Analysis”, similarly claimed that “undercover
officers and confidential informants don’t enter a mosque unless following upon a lead vetted by
Handschu.”129 Both men failed to mention how hard Cohen had worked to keep Haight and the
Handschu courtroom as isolated from and ignorant of such decisions as possible.
Behind the scenes, the Handschu authority functioned simply as a rubber stamp. Applications
from the NYPD to the authority to use CPP tactics featured “boilerplate text so routine that the same
typographical error had been cut and pasted into virtually every application OIG-NYPD reviewed,
going back over a decade,” according to a subsequent report by the New York Inspector General.130 Yet,
the authority had approved them all, abandoning all review and allowing investigations to last for years
and creep far beyond their initial targets.131 Haight's changes had helped convert its members into silent,
compliment boobies, a possibility which Haight had dismissed out of hand in 1985. Cohen's 2003
attempt to turn the Handschu authority into a stooge had worked perfectly. Judge Haight had hastily
converted the Handschu settlement from a shield, however small, against CPP into a component,
however small, in the largest domestic CPP project of the 21st century. Ironically, Cohen had finally
proved why the Handschu settlement had been necessary. His immediate revival of all the presettlement CPP tactics proved that Haight had been right: half a loaf had been better than none.
For the Handschu plaintiffs' attorneys, Apuzzo and Goldman's 2011 story triggered another long
legal battle to amend the settlement for a second time. Despite their efforts, the latest Handschu
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settlement would fail to regain the powers it lost in 2003. Though they filed to bring the NYPD to
account mere days after the first AP article was printed in 2011, this effort was not concluded until
2017. The new “revised Handschu guidelines” contained new language stating that the NYPD intended
to avoid future CPP operations against minority groups and was well received by the NYCLU.132
However, beyond this inclusive language, 2017's “revised Handschu guidelines” differed only slightly
from 2003's “modified Handschu guidelines.”
The most significant change was replacing the Modified Handschu authority with a new
oversight body, the Handschu committee, to whom the NYPD would have to apply to authorize CPP.
The committee would meet monthly to discuss the approval, extension, or closing of investigations and
human sources and to review investigations every 6 months. However, the committee would lack the
power to veto political intelligence operations and its ratio of civilian to police personnel would be
further skewed than in the past, with a single civilian representative now squaring off against eleven
police employees. This representative would gain certain powers, including the responsibility of
passing non-classified information along a winding path to Haight's desk and even to the public if they
believed it violated the terms of the Revised guidelines. As Barbra Handschu herself stated in 2016,
speaking out about police abuses despite this 12-1 opposition would require “a very brave, very strong
kind of person.”133 Furthermore, the mayor, still a Handschu defendant, would gain the ability to
abolish the position entirely beginning in 2022 if the court could declare there to have been no systemic
violations in the three years prior. Without a civilian representative, the new Handschu Committee will
become a police body in sole control of CPP, the same basic arrangement which facilitated abuses
before 1971 and after 2003.134

Conclusion
132“Landmark Settlement Protects American Muslims From Discriminatory NYPD Surveillance”, New York Civil
Liberties Union, January 7, 2016.
133Neumeister, “For New York Lawyer, a 45-year-old Surveillance Case is her Legacy.”
134Handschu, 241 F.Supp.3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

Handschu's future is unclear.135 Though a relic, it has been somewhat revitalized by its 2017
alterations, which have integrated it into New York City's municipal bureaucracy. It may survive in
some form for another 50 years, under new judges and with new representative plaintiffs and
defendants. On the other hand, it may meet the fate of Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago,
which was finally dismissed entirely by a Judge Gotschall in 2011, at that city's request.136 Regardless,
Handschu is unlikely to ever become a serious, stable defense against CPP, capable of weathering
political changes. This would require drastic changes driven by a politically effective mass movement
and the goal of altering the terms of a 50-year-old court case would be unlikely to inspire such efforts
and, absent such support, Handschu's survival will likely continue to rely on its ability to remain
malleable and thus nonthreatening to its defendants.
Political action against CPP has passed Handschu by, as several recent examples demonstrate.
By the time Judge Haight approved the 2017 settlement, the NYPD had already made internal changes,
thanks to the attention which journalists like Appuzo, Goldman, and Levitt, and civil rights advocacy
groups like MACLC, brought to the issue. After they showed that INTEL's actions had been cruel,
unconstitutional, and useless, Bill DeBlasio had campaigned on abolishing the program and, after his
election, De Blasio followed this promise, shutting down the Demographics Unit, by then renamed the
Zone Assessment Unit, and calling its termination “a critical step forward in easing tensions between

135Though the Handschu settlement has been of limited value to activists, it has proven very useful to historians, by
providing access to knowledge about the NYPD's history of CPP. It secured several groundbreaking statements by police
officials, including, among others, Commissioner Murphy's affidavit and Galati's deposition. The settlement also prevented
the defendants from destroying the massive data archive it had collected from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. This
priceless historical record of New York history includes thousands of index cards and dossiers on New Yorkers and
hundreds of hours of secretly filmed footage showing New Yorkers exercising their first amendment right to assemble and
protest. Over the years, this archive was largely forgotten and when historian Johanna Fernandez sued the department to
access the files for research purposes in 2014, the department reported the archive “lost.” However, after the Village Voice,
picked up the story, the archive was “rediscovered” in a Queens warehouse. Nick Pinto, “Under Media Spotlight, City
Locates Missing Records of NYPD Political Meddling,” Village Voice, June 16, 2016. The archive's extensive collection of
video footage has now been digitized by the NYC Department of Records and can be watched for free online. “NYPD
Surveillance Films,” NYC Department of Records and Information Services .

136 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 1:74-cv-03268 (N.D. III. 1974).

the police and the communities they serve.”137 Another development came on April 5, 2018, when the
plaintiffs of Hassan v. City of New York accomplished something which Judge Haight had thought nearimpossible: they had won an appeal against the NYPD. The plaintiffs, lawyers with the activist legal
group Muslim Advocates, had sued the NYPD in 2012 on behalf of Newark area Muslims whom
INTEL had targeted. Unlike in Handschu, the NYPD had not sought settlement and, after seven years
of struggle, Philadelphia's Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in the plaintiff's favor, forcing the
NYPD to purge information collected in New Jersey by the Demographics Unit, to enlist plaintiffs in
the creation of a “policy guide on compliance with the Handschu guidelines, and to distribute amounts
between $1,250.00 and $22,500.00 to ten injured parties in damages.138
Further changes have occurred in the political realm with the Public Oversight of Surveillance
Technology (POST) Act, introduced in 2017 and approved in 2020 by a 44-6 vote in the New York City
Council. This act forced Mayor De Blasio to admit that, after abolishing the Demographics Unit, the
city had invested heavily in electronic surveillance, expanding the NYPD's camera system and
supplementing it with biometric security measures such as “facial recognition software.” Soon, the
NYPD turned these resources against political activists.139 POST also forced the NYPD to admit to
“their use of a vast network of license plate readers, thousands of surveillance cameras, mobile X-ray
vans and digital tools that are used to scrub social media profiles and retain deleted information....
without a warrant.”140 POST's democratic format gave it several advantages over Handschu. While the
1985 Handschu settlement had been primarily the result of eighteen years of work by a few
representative plaintiffs and their legal representatives, the Brennan Center credited POST to “three
137Neuman, Scott, “NYPD Shuts Down Controversial Unit That Spied On Muslims,” NPR, April 15, 2014. Though these
stories revealed that CPP projects had damaged entire communities, the revelation that they had been served no counterterror purposes likely played at least an equal role in their eventual discontinuation. In perhaps their greatest victory against
CPP since the 1985 settlement, plaintiff counsel successfully deposed INTEL Commander Thomas Galati, whose words
revealed the uselessness of the data Cohen's programs had produced in very clear terms. Just as Cohen had been unable to
point to a single specific investigation which the Handschu settlement had hindered before 2003, Galati could not name a
single investigation which had been aided by the data gathered. Shamas and Aratsu, “Mapping Muslims,” 49.
138Colin Moynihan, “Last Suit Accusing N.Y.P.D. Of Spying on Muslims is Settled,” New York Times, April 5, 2018.
139Ali Watkins, “How the N.Y.P.D. Is Using Post-9/11 Tools on Everyday New Yorkers,” New York Times, October 13,
2021.
140Watkins, “Post-9/11 Tools.”

years of persistent advocacy from civil rights groups and community activists.” Because it was not
litigated, POST did not have to follow legal precedent. Because it was not a settlement, it was able to
impose terms on the NYPD.141 These factors indicate that, in the 21st century at least, legislation,
achieved through popular mobilization, has been far more effective, and far quicker, than court actions
like Handschu.
In 1971, the Handschu plaintiffs based their grand ambitions on the assumed support of a
sympathetic legal system rather than on fellow victims of CPP. Given the political and legal
circumstances of the time, this no doubt seemed the natural choice. Though Bell's time with the
NAACP had made him skeptical of judicial activism, it was not until 1976 that he proposed that “law
and lawyers [had] received perhaps too much credit for” the successes of a Civil Rights movement
which had truly relied on grassroots activism and local political power.142 Horowitz did not publish
“Decreeing Organizational Change” until 1983.143 With the benefit of decades more hindsight, legal
scholar Gerald Rosenberg memorably compared the court's contribution to social change to “officially
recognizing the evolving state of affairs, more like the cutting of the ribbon on a new project than its
construction” and advised activists to avoid the legal system entirely, instead pursuing “political
organizing, political mobilization, and voter registration... not as a fallback position, not as a
compliment to a legal strategy, but as the strategy itself.”144 None of these men foresaw the end of the
judicial era which the Warren Court had fostered.
Still, speaking with hindsight, it seems clear that, by placing their faith in the decisions of
judges, rather than the class members who they fought so long to help, the Handschu plaintiffs and
their representatives isolated themselves from their greatest means of support. I am not deriding the
Handschu plaintiffs for their early ambitions. No social change can occur if people do not aim high. I
141“The Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act: A Resource Page,” Brennan Center for Justice, 2021,
updated March 5, 2021.
142Bell, “Serving Two Masters,” 512-513.
143Horowitz, Donald L. “Decreeing Organizational Change.”
144Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, 422, 431.

am saying that they were wrong to believe they could achieve these lofty aims by placing their faith in
a single man. Horowitz was correct when he argued that judges lacked the experience and knowledge
to dictate policy, but all individuals make mistakes. It was Haight's non-accountability, not his
inexperience, which doomed the Handschu settlement to eventual alteration and irrelevancy. No single
pillar could have born such a great weight alone.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Cobb, Jelani. “The Man Behind Critical Race Theory. The New Yorker, September 13, 2021,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/09/20/the-man-behind-critical-race-theory.
Dunn, Christopher, Arthur Eisenberg, Donna Lieberman, Alan Silver, Alex Vitale, “Arresting Protest: A
Special Report of the New York Civil Liberties Union on New York City's Protest Policies at the

February 15th, 2003 Antiwar Demonstration in New York City.” New York Civil Liberties Union,
2003, https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjW2sGFqtP3AhUJkokEHcxbBdUQFnoE
CAIQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aclu.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FFilesPDFs
%2Fnyclu_arresting_protest1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2uoyS4pK7O7O3oPmihQsk0.

Joseph, George. “NYPD officers accessed Black Lives Matter activists' texts, documents show.”
Guardian, April 4, 2017, Modified on November 27, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/apr/04/nypd-police-black-lives-matter-surveillance-undercover.
Koeltl, John G. “The Storied Third Branch: Reflections on Judge Edward Weinfeld.” Judicature 100,
no. 2 (Summer, 2016). https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/the-storied-third-branch-reflections-on-judge-edward-weinfeld/ .
“Landmark Settlement Protects American Muslims From Discriminatory NYPD Surveillance”, New
York Civil Liberties Union, January 7, 2016, https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/landmark-settlementprotects-american-muslims-discriminatory-nypd-surveillance.
Levitt, Leonard. “Guidelines often misunderstood.” NYPD Confidential, October 7, 2002, http://www.nypdconfidential.com/columns/2002/021007.html.
Leonard Levitt, Leonard. “Intel's Micheal Silber: Blind to the Facts.” NYPD Confidential, June 4,
2012, http://www.nypd-confidential.com/columns/2012/120604.html.
Levitt, Leonard. “Kelly on Muslim Spying: Who, Us?” NYPD Confidential, November 21, 2011,
http://www.nypd-confidential.com/columns/2011/111121.html.
Levitt, Leonard. “No Connection to Intelligence.” NYPD Confidential, September 30, 2002,
http://www.nypd-confidential.com/columns/2002/020930.html.
Levitt, Leonard. “Targeting Muslims: Does Anyone Care?” NYPD Confidential, September 26, 2011,
http://www.nypd-confidential.com/columns/2011/110926.html.
Levitt, Leonard. “The Spoils of Spying.” NYPD Confidential, January 8, 2012, http://www.nypdconfidential.com/columns/2012/120109.html.
Moynihan, Colin. “Last Suit Accusing N.Y.P.D. Of Spying on Muslims is Settled.” New York Times,
April 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/nyregion/last-suit-accusing-nypd-of-spying-on-muslims-issettled.html.
Neuman, Scott. “NYPD Shuts Down Controversial Unit That Spied On Muslims.” NPR, April 15,
2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/04/15/303425055/nypd-shuts-down-controversial-unit-that-spied-on-muslims .
Neumeister, Larry. “For NY lawyer, a 45-year-old surveillance case is her legacy.” AP News, May 28,
2016.

https://apnews.com/article/452c1f776f9d48c2a
dc1b8ae30494034.

Pinto, Nick. “Occupy's Undercover Cop: 'Shady,' Ubiquitous, & Willing To Get Arrested.” Gothamist,
October 10, 2013, Modified May 6, https://gothamist.com/news/occupys-undercover-cop-shady-ubiquitous-willingto-get-arrested.
Pinto, Nick. “Under Media Spotlight, City Locates Missing Records of NYPD Political Meddling.”
Village Voice, June 16, 2016, https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/06/16/under-media-spotlight-city-locatesmissing-records-of-nypd-political-meddling/.
Reinhold, Robert. “Law Communes’ in Cities Seek Social Change Through Politics.” New York Times,
September 5, 1971. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/05/archives/law-communes-seeking-socialchange-law-communes-in-cities-seek.html.
Shamas, Diala and Nermeen Arastu. “Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on American
Muslims.” Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC) and Creating Law Enforcement
Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) Project (2013), https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj5yMm5rtP3AhXGj
YkEHWssCBQQFnoECAcQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.law.cuny.edu%2Fwp-content
%2Fuploads%2Fpage-assets%2Facademics%2Fclinics%2Fimmigration%2Fclear%2FMappingMuslims.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0llaejTqElqY36NwUd4_Yi.

Court Decisions and Documents:
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 1:74-cv-03268 (N.D. III. 1974).
Complaint-Class Action, 1:71-cv-02203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, LEXIS 12148 1979 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 787 F.2d 828 (2nd Cir. 1986).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, LEXIS 5349 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 131 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, WL 151974 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 273 F. Supp. 2D 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 288 F. Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 475 F. Supp. 2D 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, WL 1711775 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

Handschu v. Special Services Division, WL 666940 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, No. 71CIV.2203 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 241 F.Supp.3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Milliken v. Bradly, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

Secondary Sources
Books and Articles:
Akbar, Amna. “Policing 'Radicalization.'” UC Irvine Law Review 3, no. 4 (2013): 809-881.
Althouse, Ann. “How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power.” Harvard Law
Review 100, 1485 (1987).
Apuzzo, Matt, and Adam Goldman, Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD's Secret Spying Unit and Bin
Laden's Final Plot Against America. Touchstone: New York, 2013.
Belknap, Micheal R. “Book Review: Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in
Urban America by Frank Donner.” Constitutional Commentary 9, no. 2 (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, 1992): 371-379.
Bell, Derrick. “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma.” Harvard Law
Review 93, No. 3 (January 1980): 518-533.
Bell, Derrick. “Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation.” Yale Law Journal 85, No. 4 (March 1976): 470-51.
Bell, Derrick. Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial
Reform. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Donner, Frank. Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
Gardner, Trevor George. “Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History of Police
Federalism.” Columbia Law Review 119, no. 1 (January 2019): 1-83.

Hinton, Elizabeth. From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime; The Making of Mass Incarceration
in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.
Horowitz, Donald L. “Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervisions of Public Institutions.”
Duke Law Journal 1983, no. 6 (December 1983): 1265-1307.
Johnson, Marilynn S. Street Justice; A History of Police Violence in New York City. Boston: Beacon
Press, 2003.
Klarman, Michael J. From Jim Crow to Civil Rights; The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial
Equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Lain, Corinna Barrett. “Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the
Criminal Procedure Revolution.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 152, no. 4 (2004): 1361–
1452. https://doi.org/10.2307/3313044.
L. M. G. “Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for Police Misconduct.” Virginia Law Review 62, no. 7
(November 1976): 1259-1283.
Patterson, James T. Brown v. Board of Education; A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled Legacy.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Rosenberg, Gerald. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. Second Edition.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Walker, Anders. The Ghost of Jim Crow: How Southern Moderates Used Brown v. Board of Education
to Stall Civil Rights. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Websites:
“Biography – Senior Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr.,” USCourts, https://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/biography-seniorjudge-charles-s-haight-jr.
“Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman, Eileen Sullivan and Chris Hawley of the Associated Press,” Pulitzer,
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/matt-apuzzo-adam-goldman-eileen-sullivan-and-chris-hawley.
“NYPD Surveillance Films,” NYC Department of Records and Information Services,
https://nycma.lunaimaging.com/luna/servlet/view/all?sort=identifier%2Ctitle%2Cdate&pgs=50&res=1&cic=NYCMA
%7E3%7E3.

“The Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act: A Resource Page,” Brennan Center for
Justice, updated March 5, 2021, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/public-oversightsurveillance-technology-post-act-resource-page.
“Section 1983 and Civil Rights Lawsuits,” FindLaw, updated March 20, 2019,
https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-rights/42-u-s-code-section-1983.html.

